Iran has threatened for years to close the Strait of Hormuz. Now the regime appears to be trying.
In recent days Iranian forces have attacked commercial shipping, deployed naval mines, and warned that the strait will remain closed as part of its confrontation with the United States and Israel. In his first statement after assuming power, Iran’s newly elevated and largely yet-to-be-seen supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, declared that the Strait of Hormuz should remain closed as leverage against the United States and its allies.
The stakes are enormous. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, roughly 20 percent of the world’s petroleum liquids consumption and about a fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the most important maritime energy chokepoint in the world. Even temporary disruptions can send shockwaves through global energy markets.
The key question now is whether Iran can actually close the strait and whether the United States and its allies can reopen it.
History and current military realities suggest the answer is yes. But doing so requires a deliberate military campaign that unfolds in phases.
Iran’s actions so far illustrate both the power and the limits of its strategy. While disruptive, the attacks have been relatively limited. Iranian forces have struck or harassed several commercial vessels operating in the Persian Gulf region, including oil tankers transiting near the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian forces have also reportedly deployed a limited number of naval mines, estimated in early reporting to be around ten, in the waterway.
Even a small number of mines can halt maritime traffic. In modern shipping markets, the economic impact of mines often exceeds their military effect. Insurance rates spike, ports suspend operations, and shipping companies refuse to send vessels through potentially mined waters until naval forces can clear the area. But from a military perspective, the scale of these actions remains limited relative to Iran’s full capability.
Iran’s maritime strategy in the strait relies heavily on asymmetric naval warfare, a doctrine the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has developed for decades. Rather than relying on large conventional warships, Iran uses a network of smaller and harder-to-target systems including fast attack boats designed for swarm tactics, sea mines, unmanned surface vessels and drones, shore-based anti-ship missile batteries, and coastal surveillance and targeting systems. These capabilities are designed to disrupt shipping and create global economic pressure, not to defeat the U.S. Navy outright.
To reopen the strait, the United States must first dismantle this network.
The first phase of the response is already underway. Its objective is straightforward: reduce Iran’s ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to U.S. Central Command, American forces have already conducted strikes against thousands of Iranian military targets connected to the conflict. CENTCOM reported that U.S. operations have struck more than 6,000 targetsand destroyed approximately 90 Iranian vessels, including more than 60 ships and over 30 mine-laying boats involved in maritime operations.
These strikes are aimed at dismantling the infrastructure Iran uses to threaten shipping. Iranian naval vessels operating near the strait are being destroyed. Drone ships and unmanned maritime systems are being targeted. Fast attack boats used for swarm attacks are being eliminated. Mine-laying vessels and mine stockpiles are being struck before they can deploy additional weapons. Shore-based anti-ship missile batteries along Iran’s coastline are also being targeted.
U.S. Central Command has also issued warnings urging civilians to stay away from Iranian coastal areas, ports, and maritime facilities along the Persian Gulf. Such warnings typically precede or accompany sustained military operations against infrastructure connected to attacks on shipping.
Once Iran’s ability to disrupt traffic is sufficiently reduced, the next phase begins.
The United States and potentially an international coalition would escort commercial vessels through the strait.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has stated that the U.S. Navy, potentially alongside allied naval forces, will escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz as soon as it becomes militarily feasible, noting that planning for such operations has been underway for months.
The operational concept is straightforward. Commercial vessels assemble in staging areas on both sides of the strait. These areas allow ships to gather into convoys before entering the most dangerous portion of the waterway. Naval escorts then guide the vessels through the strait under armed protection.
The convoy system slows traffic but significantly reduces the vulnerability of individual ships.
This strategy is not theoretical. It has been used before.
During the late stages of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran began attacking commercial shipping in what became known as the Tanker War. Iranian forces struck oil tankers and laid naval mines throughout the Persian Gulf in an effort to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure Gulf states supporting Iraq.
In response, President Ronald Reagan launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987, one of the largest naval convoy operations since World War II. The United States began escorting reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Gulf under U.S. naval protection, and the operation continued for more than a year. The presence of U.S. naval escorts helped reassure global energy markets and restore confidence that oil could continue to flow through the Gulf despite Iranian attacks.
The mission carried significant risk. In April 1988 the U.S. Navy frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian naval mine, severely damaging the ship.
The United States responded with Operation Praying Mantis, the largest U.S. naval surface combat action since World War II. In a single day of fighting, U.S. naval forces destroyed multiple Iranian ships, sank several vessels, and crippled key elements of Iran’s naval capability. Iranian naval attacks on Gulf shipping declined sharply afterward.
Iran can disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It can temporarily halt traffic through mines, missile attacks, or harassment of commercial vessels. Even limited attacks can cause insurers and shipping companies to pause operations.
But permanently closing the strait is far more difficult.
To do that Iran would have to defeat the most powerful navy in the world operating in one of the regions where it has spent decades preparing to fight.
The coming weeks may still be dangerous. Mines may damage ships. Drones or missiles may strike tankers. But if the United States follows the same playbook used in the 1980s, first destroying Iran’s ability to threaten shipping and then escorting vessels safely through the strait, the waterway will reopen.
Iran has tried to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz before.
History suggests it will not succeed in closing it this time either.
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John Spencer is the Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum
He is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare
Learn more at www.johnspenceronline.com
Substack: https://substack.com/@spencerguard
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.
